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IMPEDIMENTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION IN NIGERIA 
JACOB ABIODUN DADA* 
When the United Nations introduced the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, it was seen by many as a sign of 
optimism, of the possibilities of a better world. Yet over 50 years 
later, observers recognize that we live in an age when human 
rights abuses are as prevalent as they have ever been; in some 
instances more prevalent. The world is littered with examples of 
violation of basic rights: censorship, discrimination, political 
imprisonment, torture, slavery, the death penalty, 
disappearances, genocide, poverty, refugees. The rights of 
women, children and other groups in society continue to be 
ignored in atrocious ways. The environmental crisis takes the 
discourse on rights to a different level. D.J. O’Byrne.1 
ABSTRACT 
The promotion and protection of human rights have engaged the 
attention of the world community, and though the African country of 
Nigeria has subscribed to major international human rights instruments, 
violations continue to occur with disturbing frequency and regularity in 
that nation. Why is this so? This article examines the multifarious and 
multidimensional impediments which have hamstrung meaningful 
enjoyment of human rights in Nigeria. It points out the shortcomings of 
the dualist model under the Nigerian Constitution and stresses the 
  
 * J. A. Dada, Esq. LL.B(Hon) Jos; B.L; LL.M., Ph.D Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
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 DARREN J. O’BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2003). 
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objectionable wide amplitude of the derogation clauses. It also makes 
suggestions for reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is elementary knowledge that human rights have become a global 
subject, with global appeal. The fact that human rights have gained 
remarkable attention, prominence, and significance in our world of 
pluralism, diversity, and interdependence stems from their very nature.2  
Human rights are rights which all human beings have by virtue of their 
humanity, such as right to life, dignity of human person, personal liberty, 
fair hearing and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. They 
provide a common standard of behavior among the international 
community.3 To demonstrate the important character of human rights, a 
learned author insightfully declared that: “the issue of human rights in 
the recent past, has penetrated the international dialogue, become an 
active ingredient in interstate relations and has burst the sacred bounds of 
national sovereignty.”4 
It is for the foregoing reason that virtually all nations of the world, 
including Nigeria, have subscribed to the major international human 
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
1948; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
(ICCPR); The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 1966 (ICESCR); and other regional human rights instruments. 
However, it must be remembered—as perceptibly noted by an astute 
author —that “human rights are more than a collection of formal norms, 
they are dynamic political, social, economic, juridical, as well as moral, 
cultural and philosophical conditions which define the intrinsic value of 
man and his inherent dignity.”5 
The practical implication of this is that international human rights 
promotion, protection, and enforcement transcend mere formal 
  
 2. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights]; U.N. Charter pmbl. The preambles of both the UDHR and the U.N. Charter recognize 
human rights as inherent in man. Paragraph 2 of the U.N. Charter, for instance, “reaffirm[s] faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small.” 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, at ¶ 8. See also Muhammad Haleem, 
The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, in DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 91, 91-
92 (1988).  
 4. Thomas W. Wilson, Jr., A Bedrock Consensus of Human Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 47 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1979).  
 5. MOSES MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1974). 
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subscription6 to their ideals or—more poignantly put—mere 
domestication. As Bhagwati7 has noted, 
The language of human rights carries great rhetorical force of 
uncertain practical significance. At the level of rhetoric, human 
rights have an image which is both morally compelling and 
attractively uncompromising. But what is necessary is that the 
highly general statements of human rights which ideally use the 
language of universality, inalienability and indefeasibility should 
be transformed into more particular formulations, if the rhetoric 
of human rights is to have major impact on the resolution of 
social and economic problems in a country. 
Although Nigeria is a signatory to many international human rights 
instruments8 and has laudable and inspiring constitutional provisions for 
their protection,9 there are varying degrees of human rights violations in 
the nation, and governance is characterized by acute disregard for, and 
sadistic undermining of, these basic rights and fundamental freedoms.10 
Indeed, today, as in the inglorious days of military rule, frequent cases of 
extra-judicial killings,11 unjustifiable torture of detainees by security 
agents, unbridled curtailment of freedom of the press,12 and objectionable 
discrimination against women,13 are still witnessed. Also, politically 
motivated arrests and detentions have continued unabated, and lengthy 
  
 6. Id. 
 7. P. N. Bhagwati, Inaugural Address, in DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE 
DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS xx, xx (1988). Bhagwati’s 
address was given at the Judicial Colloquium in Bangalore, held February 24-26, 1988. 
 8. Such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
 9. Two chapters of the 1999 Constitution (chapters 2 and 4) are exclusively dedicated to 
human rights. In addition, Nigeria has established ostensibly strong institutional infrastructure for 
human rights promotion and protection. Apart from the judicial organ, Nigeria has extrajudicial 
bodies for human rights promotion and protection. These include the National Human Rights 
Commission and the Public Complaints Commission. 
 10. For recent examples of human rights violations in Nigeria, see the latest Human Rights 
Report submitted by the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Congress, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160138.pdf. For more examples, see Adejuwon 
Soyinka, On Death Row, TELL MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Apr. 20, 2009 at 22. 
 11. On December, 28, 2006, the Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun, announced that 
police killed 1,694 suspected armed robbers during the year. 
 12. As exemplified in the repeated raid of newspaper houses like the Insider, and confiscation 
of issues of the magazines and newspapers, in 2009, the office of Leadership Newspaper was sealed 
and its operatives arrested allegedly for publishing a false story about the health of President Umaru 
Yar’Adua. 
 13. Examples of such objectionable practices include, widowhood rites and female genital 
mutilation. 
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pre-trial detentions of detainees14 have continued with impunity. The 
pertinent question therefore is: what are the factors responsible for 
human rights violations in Nigeria despite the nation’s subscription to, 
and adoption of, many human rights instruments? 
There are multifarious and multi-dimensional impediments to the full 
realization of human rights in Nigeria. The primary burden of this paper 
is to investigate, interrogate, and articulate these impediments. In 
execution of this mandate this paper is divided into two broad parts. Part 
1 explores factors limiting human rights goals in Nigeria, and Part II 
prescribes constitutional and institutional reforms. Before delving into 
the main thrust of the paper however, it is not only relevant but also 
imperative to note that Nigeria is the most populous nation on the 
African continent, and it was admitted as the 100th member of the United 
Nations. The country, located in the West African sub-region, has over 
100 ethnic nationalities and was buffeted by many military coups until 
political liberalization was ushered in by the return to civilian rule in 
1999. 
I. FACTORS LIMITING HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS IN NIGERIA 
The impediments to human rights promotion and protection in Nigeria 
can be classified as constitutional, social, and political, among others. 
Many constitutional provisions on human rights, rather than energize and 
galvanize human rights goals, obviously limit and undermine them. For 
instance, there are numerous derogation clauses which are not only too 
wide but ill-defined and nebulous. This constitutes a formidable 
weakness which can gravely undermine human rights promotion. 
Similarly, the socio-political environment in Nigeria is not sufficiently 
clement or conducive to meaningful human rights regime. Often, 
government exhibits regrettable autocratic tendencies and erects a culture 
of impunity by regular disobedience to court orders. The result is that 
those who have the material means to seek legal redress are often left 
with no remedy. For clarity, the various impediments will now be 
examined under various headings as follows: 
A. THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria concerns treaties and their 
implementation. Since international human rights instruments are, 
essentially, multi-lateral treaties, a careful examination of the provisions 
  
 14. For instance, in 2002, 350 inmates of Kirikiri Prison filed an action challenging the 
constitutionality of their detention without trial for a long period of time. 
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of section 12 becomes not only relevant but imperative. The section 
provides that: 
(i) No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall 
have force of law except to the extent to which any such 
treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly. 
(ii) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or 
any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the 
Exclusive Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a 
treaty. 
What therefore is the implication of the foregoing in light of the well-
known principle of international law of treaties that a state cannot be 
bound by any agreement to which it has not given its consent—either by 
signing, ratification, accession or any other means of declaration of intent 
to be bound?15 Besides, most treaties are not self-executing and as such, 
parties to them are usually enjoined to institute municipal measures to 
guarantee the application of such treaties within their domestic systems.16 
The implication of the provisions of section 12 of the 1999 Constitution 
is simply that human rights treaties entered into by Nigeria will not 
become binding until the same have been passed into law by the National 
Assembly. In General Sani Abacha v. Gain Fawehinmi,17 the Supreme 
Court held that by section 12(1) of the 1979 Constitution (the ipissima 
verbis of section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution), “an international treaty 
entered into by the government of Nigeria does not become ipso facto 
binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly and before its 
enactment, an international treaty has no force of law as to make its 
provisions actionable in Nigerian law courts.”18 Further, the court 
unanimously held that “unincorporated treaties cannot change any aspect 
of Nigerian law even though Nigeria is a party to those treaties” but that 
they may “however indirectly affect the rightful expectation by the 
citizen that governmental acts affecting them would observe the terms of 
the unincorporated treaties.”19   
  
 15. Except where such agreements are mere declarations of existing norms of customary 
international law. 
 16. For more information on human rights treaties within states’ legal and political systems, 
see HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS 725-729 (1st ed. 1996).   
 17. Abacha v. Fawehinmi, [2000] 6 NWLR 228 (Nigeria). 
 18. The reenactment of international treaties into domestic law is what is referred to as the 
concept of domestication or transformation of treaties. Id.  
 19. Id.  
43
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The practical significance of the provisions of section 12 of the 1999 
Constitution in the context of human rights promotion and protection, 
therefore, is that international human rights treaties are not ipso facto 
applicable and enforceable in Nigeria unless they are domesticated as in 
the case of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.20 
Accordingly, the effectiveness of ratified human rights treaties is 
predicated on their being domesticated. This is so because the provision 
of the constitution is supreme. The Supreme Court unequivocally made 
the foregoing point as follows:  
Constitution is the supreme law of the land; it is the grundnorm. 
Its supremacy has never been called to question in ordinary 
circumstance. Thus, any treaty enacted into law in Nigeria by 
virtue of section 12(1) of the 1979 Constitution (now section 
12(1) 1999 Constitution) is circumscribed in its operational 
scope and extent as may be prescribed by the legislature.21 
B. THE PROBLEM OF PRIMACY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMS AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
International agreements—particularly those relating to human rights—
employ two approaches, namely the ‘treaty’ method and the ‘non-treaty’ 
method. Whereas the treaty method creates legally binding obligations 
on state parties, the non-treaty method establishes non-legal 
commitments to guide signatory states.22 Nigeria’s international 
obligations, primarily those concerning human rights, are treaty-based. 
For instance, the National Assembly in March, 1983 incorporated holus 
bolus, the text of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
into the corpus of domestic legislation. The wholesale incorporation of 
the Charter raises certain fundamental issues which appertain to any 
domesticated human rights treaty. For instance, the 1999 Constitution 
draws a distinction between justiceable and non-justiceable human 
rights.23 The Charter, on the other hand, makes no distinction between 
economic, social, and cultural rights, on the one hand and civil and 
political rights on the other. One important question which arises 
therefore is the implication of the wholesale domestication. Again, in the 
event of conflict between the Nigerian Constitution, Nigerian statutes, 
  
 20. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 
(1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. Nigeria signed (1982), 
ratified (1983), and domesticated the African Charter as Cap 10, LFN, 1990 or Cap A9, LFN, 2004. 
 21. Abacha, 6 NWLR at 258. 
 22. See Fred W. Reinke, Treaty and Non-Treaty Human Rights Agreements: A Case Study of 
Freedom of Movement in East Germany, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 647, 647-648 (1986).  
 23. While the Provisions of chapter iv dealing with Civil and Political Rights are justiceable, 
those of Chapter II, encapsulating social, economic and cultural rights are made non-justiceable. 
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and the Charter, as incorporated, which one prevails? This last question 
raises the issue of primacy between international human rights norms and 
domestic legislation.  
On the relationship between international human rights instruments and 
domestic law—which includes the Constitution—two principal schools 
of thought have emerged, viz monism and dualism. In addition to these 
dominant theories, a lesser theory that has also been propounded is the 
harmonization theory.24  Monism asserts that international law and 
municipal law form part of a universal legal order serving the needs of 
the human community one way or another. By this theory, any 
international treaty, including those concerned with human rights, 
ratified or assented to by a state is directly enforceable within the 
municipal system. On the other hand, dualism holds that international 
law and municipal law are two distinct legal orders.25 Thus, each may 
isolate the other, and as such, ratified treaties are not enforceable until 
the parliament enacts a law to incorporate them into the municipal law. 
The harmonization theory holds that man is the focus of both areas as 
man lives in both jurisdictions. Harmonization theorists contend that both 
systems are concordant bodies of doctrine, autonomous but harmonious 
in their aim of achieving the basic good and therefore reject the 
presumed conflict between international law and national law. 
In Nigeria, the dualist or indirect system applies by virtue of the 
provision of section 12 of the 1999 Constitution. It is for this reason that 
the Supreme Court unequivocally held that no treaty applies unless it is 
ratified. Further, the court held that the Constitution, by virtue of its 
supremacy, has primacy over international law in the event of conflict 
between the two.26 In the words of the court, any treaty enacted into law 
in Nigeria by virtue of section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution, is 
circumscribed in its operational scope and extent as may be prescribed 
by the legislature.27  
As relating to the conflict between international law and other national 
law, the Supreme Court unfortunately did not make an unequivocal 
pronouncement. However, the court noted that “in incorporating African 
Charter, this country (Nigeria) provided that the treaty shall rank at par 
  
 24. For analysis of these theories, see D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (5th ed. 1998); H.O. AGARWAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 43-45 (17th ed. 2010). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Abacha, 6 NWLR at 255. 
 27. Id. at 258.  
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with other ordinary municipal laws.”28 On the other hand, Mr. Justice 
Mohammed (JSC) held that:  
[T[he African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Notification and Enforcement Act, Cap 10 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990) is a statute with international flavor. 
Therefore, if there is a conflict between it and another statute, its 
provisions will prevail over those of that other status for the 
reason that it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to 
breach an international obligation. Thus it possesses a greater 
vigor and strength than any other domestic statute.29 
The view that international instruments, including human rights 
instruments, should take precedence over domestic legislation, it is 
submitted is a better and preferred view. The subscription of Nigeria to 
those norms by ratification of the treaties means that the Nigerian 
governments and their judicial agencies are not legally permitted to 
derogate from those norms. Accordingly, international human rights 
norms should be interpreted and enforced in such a manner as to confer 
primacy on international human rights instruments over domestic 
legislation.30 
C. RESERVATION CLAUSES IN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS  
A careful and painstaking content analysis of the various international 
human rights instruments reveals that there are many ill-defined 
instances of permissible derogations inherent in them. In other words, 
many of the human rights guaranteed in international human rights 
instruments are not sacrosanct or granted in absolute terms. Rather, the 
various instruments create instances where it is legitimate and legally 
sustainable for the rights to be violated. Although virtually all the rights 
granted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 are not 
qualified,31 the same thing cannot be said of the two Covenants32 which 
elaborated on the provisions of the Declaration. For instance, Article 4 of 
  
 28. Id. at 255. Justice Achike, in his dissent, found that “a close study of that Act [Cap 10] 
does not demonstrate, directly or indirectly, that it had been ‘elevated to a higher pedestal’ in relation 
to other municipal legislation.” Id. at 316-317.  
 29. Id. at 251. 
 30. C. E. Obiagwu, International Human Rights Framework: A Challenge to Nigerian Courts, 
in CURRENT THEMES IN THE DOMESTICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 51, 58 (C.C. Nweze & 
Obiageli Nwankwo eds., 2003). 
 31. Articles 9 and 12, however, seem to contemplate permissible derogation by the use of the 
expression “arbitrary.”  Also, Article 29(2) recognizes permissible limitations in the enjoyment and 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in the Declaration. 
 32. That is, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Both covenants were adopted on December 16, 1966. 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes and 
provides for permissible derogations in the following terms: 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation, and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the 
state parties … may take measures derogating from their 
obligations under the present covenant…33 
Similarly, Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Right allows restrictions and limitations on the rights it 
guarantees. The Article provides that: 
The states parties to the present covenant recognize that, in the 
enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity 
with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only 
to limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may 
be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society. 
The African Charter also contains derogation clauses. For instance, 
Article 6 provides inter alia that “no one may be deprived of his freedom 
except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law…” while 
Article 11, in limiting the right to assemble freely, permits “necessary 
restrictions provided for by law.” 34  
The practical and legal implication of these derogation clauses is simply 
that a state is permitted to limit, restrict, abridge, or suspend the 
enjoyment of these rights. While it may be inappropriate to contend that 
all the rights should be given in absolute terms, it is a matter of grave 
concern that the instances of permissible derogation are not well-defined 
and as such, susceptible and amenable to abuse. For instance, no 
definition is offered by the Convention on Civil, and Political Rights of 
what constitutes a “public emergency.” Apart from the problem of 
definition, how do we react to derogations during a state-induced public 
emergency? It is respectfully submitted that the wide and ill-defined 
permissible derogations from the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by 
some international human rights instruments is a veritable tool to 
avoidable curtailment of the protection and promotion of human rights at 
the domestic level; contextually in Nigeria. 
  
 33. Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18. 
 34. See also Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the African Charter, supra note 20. 
45
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D. CONSTITUTIONAL DEROGATIONS 
A formidable impediment to optimal enjoyment, protection, and 
promotion of human rights in Nigeria is also located in the various 
constitutional limitations and qualifications imposed on these rights. 
Section 45(1) of the 1999 Constitution, like its predecessor the 1979 
Constitution,35 provides a veritable foundation upon which any law 
invalidating fundamental rights may be justified. The section provides, 
inter-alia that: 
Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of [this] constitution 
shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society 
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health; or 
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other 
persons.36 
By the foregoing provision, the right to private and family life, freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the press, 
right to peaceful assembly and association and right to freedom of 
movement may be circumscribed or limited. Also, other human rights 
constitutionally guaranteed are not sacrosanct or absolute but are 
expressly and specifically limited. Admittedly, there may be no absolute 
right without qualifications, but the constitutional provisions limiting the 
rights guaranteed37 are somewhat imprecise, indeed nebulous, and as 
such, constitute a real drawback in the effort to promote human rights. 
For instance, what law is “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” 
does not enjoy any definition and neither is it capable of any precise 
articulation.38 This undoubtedly poses a very grave danger to optimal 
realization of human rights. In the case of DPP v. Chike Obi39 which was 
followed in Queen v. Amalgamated Press,40 the Court held that the 
sedition law, though it evidently gravely circumscribed the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech, was “reasonably 
justified in a democratic society.” It is also on account of the derogation 
clauses that the Supreme Court held in Medical and Dental Practitioners 
  
 35. See, CONSTITUTION, Art. 41(1) (1979) (Nigeria). 
 36. Section 45(1), 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
 37. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 33-36 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 38. Many courts have grappled with this problem. See, e.g., Olawoyin v. Attorney Gen. of N. 
Region, [1961] 1 N.L.R 269 (Nigeria); Williams v. Majekodunmi, [1962] 1 N.L.R 413 (Nigeria); 
Adegbenro v. Attorney Gen. of the Fed’n & Ors., [1962] 1 N.L.R. 431 (Nigeria).  
 39. D.P.P. v. Chike Obi, [1961] 1 N.L.R. 186 (Nigeria). 
 40. Queen v. Amalgamated Press, [1961] 1 N.L.R. 199 (Nigeria). 
10
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Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu & Anor41 that all freedoms are limited 
by state policy or overriding public interest. 
To demonstrate the amplitude and plenitude of the dangers posed by 
these nebulous constitutional derogations, reference may be made to the 
provision of section 33(1) of the 1999 Constitution which guarantees the 
right to life. The section permits derogation from this right, in execution 
of a sentence of a court with respect to a criminal offense, and goes on to 
provide that:  
a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life 
…if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such 
circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is 
reasonably necessary -  
(a) for the defense of any person from unlawful violence or for 
the defense of property; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; or 
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or muting.42 
With the characteristic overzealousness of Nigerian security agents—
especially the police, many of whom are ill-trained and ill-motivated—
this provision is often abused.43 This derogation explains the worrisome 
cases of extra-judicial killings which have been witnessed in Nigeria,44 
and is particularly disturbing because of its wide amplitude. For instance, 
death resulting from the use of force is permitted in order to effect lawful 
arrest or to prevent escape from lawful custody, irrespective of the nature 
or gravity of the offense for which the arrest is to be made or for which 
the person was incarcerated. With this type of provision, the police can 
be said to have been unwittingly licensed to kill.45 
  
 41. Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu, [2001] 3 S.C.N.J. 
106. 
 42. Section 33(2), 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
 43. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council various reports, in U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Report of the Human Rights Council on its Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/1-A/HRC/9/27 (Feb. 
9, 2008). The reports were discussed in Adejuwon Soyinka, On Death Row, TELL MAGAZINE 
(Nigeria), Apr. 20, 2009, at 22.  
 44. Examples of extra-judicial killings include the deaths of Dele Udoh, the Nigerian athlete 
who was brutally murdered at a road block, Colonel Rindam, Nwogu Okere and more recently, 
Mohammed Yusuf—the leader of the Islamic sect Boko Haram—and the six Igbo traders, known as 
“Apo six.” For more information on these extra-judicial killings, see Editorial Comment, THE 
PUNCH, Aug. 13, 2009, at 14; see also SUNDAY TRIBUNE, May 19, 1991, at 1; NEWSWATCH, Aug. 
24, 2009, at 10-18.  
 45. In 2007, authorities claimed that more than eight thousand people had been killed since 
2000 in gun duels with the police. These killings have attracted the condemnation of human rights 
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E. IMPACT & CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY RULE 
Military intervention in the politics of many African countries including 
Nigeria has, undoubtedly, had quite a destabilizing effect on human 
rights.46 Military governments—with their questionable legitimacy—are 
characteristically not only lacking in elements of constitutionalism, but 
are essentially totalitarian and autocratic, apparently intoxicated by the 
power that flows from the barrel of the gun. Lack of civility, decency, 
and respect for the rule of law are usually manifested by military rulers. 
Nigeria, with its long history of military rule, has witnessed monumental 
infractions of human rights. There are various dimensions of military 
rule which are antithetical to the protection and promotion of human 
rights. Aduba47 has incisively and elaborately identified these dimensions 
which are: exclusion of courts’ jurisdiction,48 lack of provisions for 
appeal in military decrees and edicts, use of Special Military Tribunals to 
try cases,49 and detention without trial. Other ways identified by the 
learned author50 in which military rule has negatively impacted human 
rights are:  the passing of retrospective penal legislation, placement of 
the burden of proof in criminal cases on the accused, and executive 
lawlessness and disobedience of lawful orders of the court. 
Exclusion of courts’ jurisdiction by successive military administrations 
constituted a formidable problem to meaningful enjoyment of human 
rights in Nigeria during the military era. Military governments 
characteristically promulgated decrees which ousted the jurisdiction of 
the court. For instance, The Federal Military Government (Supremacy 
and Enforcement Powers) Decree51  provided that: 
  
groups. See The Punch Editorial, THE PUNCH 14, Aug. 13, 2009. See also Nigeria: Great Nation, 
Poor Human Rights, NEWSWATCH No. 16, Apr. 20, 2009, at 18-26.  
 46. Osita Eze clearly demonstrates the gravity of the problem. See OSITA C. EZE, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 4-5 (1984). 
 47. J. Nnamadi Aduba, The Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria, in TEXT FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS TEACHING IN SCHOOLS 109, 129-132 (A.O. Obilade & C.O. Nwankwo, eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter Aduba]. 
 48. Examples of decrees with ouster clauses include the State Security (Detention of Persons) 
Decree No. 2 (1984) (Nigeria) and the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement 
of Powers) Decree No. 13 (1984)(Nigeria). 
 49. The composition of the membership of the Tribunal does not inspire confidence as to its 
members’ impartiality and competence. Besides, the proceedings of the Tribunals are expected to be 
concluded within two weeks. See, e.g., Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Act (1990), Cap. 
410, § 6(1) (Nigeria).  
 50. Aduba, supra note 47, at 131-132. 
 51. Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 13 
(1984) (Nigeria); see also Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No. 28 of 1970; and Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No. 12 of 1994. 
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No civil proceedings shall be or be instituted in any court on 
account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or 
purported to be done under or pursuant to any Decree or Edict 
and if such proceedings are instituted before or on or later than 
the commencement of this Decree, the proceedings shall abate or 
be discharged and made void.  
Specifically dealing with the human rights constitutionally guaranteed, 
the Decree provided in clear and unequivocal language that: 
the question whether any provision of Chapter iv of the 
Constitution52 has been or is being or would be contravened by 
anything done or proposed to be done in pursuance of any 
Decree or an Edict shall not be inquired into by any court of law 
and accordingly no provisions of the constitution shall apply in 
respect of any such question.53 
By this ouster clause, the courts are precluded from inquiring into the 
legality or otherwise of any power exercised pursuant thereto, even if an 
infraction of the human rights of the citizen has occurred. Provisions 
such as the foregoing gravely reduced the “ambit of human rights to 
vanishing point.”54 In Kanada v. Governor of Kaduna State,55 the Court 
of Appeal held inter alia that the effect of this type of decree was to 
suspend the courts’ jurisdiction and stop any proceedings instituted 
before the coming-into-force of the decree. 
The case of Wang Chin-Yao v. Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters56 is 
of profound relevance and importance when considering the impact of 
ouster clauses in military decrees as they affect human rights. In that 
case, the appellants had been detained under the State Security 
(Detention of Persons) Decree57 following their arrest by officers of the 
Customs and Excise when found in possession of blank attested invoices 
and Proforma invoices relating to imported goods. The Decree, by 
section 4, barred legal actions against any person for anything done or 
  
 52. That is, the Chapter concerning human rights. 
 53. Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 13 § 1(2)(b)(i) 
(1984) (Nigeria). Similarly, section 4(1) of the notorious State Security (Detention of Persons) 
Decree No. 2 (1984) provides that “[n]o suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person 
for anything done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Decree.”  
 54. P. U Umoh, Human Rights in Nigeria: Impediments to Realization, 2 Univ. Uyo L.J. 41, 46 
(1988). 
 55. Kanada v. Governor of Kaduna State, [1984] 4 NWLR 361 (Nigeria). 
 56. Wang Chin-Yao v. Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, [1986] LRC (Const.) 319 
(Nigeria). Reported also in GANI FAWEHINMI, NIGERIAN LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 437 (1996). 
 57. State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 (1984) (Nigeria). 
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intended to be done in pursuance of the Decree. The learned trial judge 
refused to issue the writ. Being aggrieved, the appellants appealed to the 
Court of Appeal. In delivering the judgment of the court, Ademola, J.C.A 
held, inter alia, that “the combined effect of Decree No. 2 and Decree 13 
of 1984 is that on the question of civil liberties, the law courts of Nigeria 
must as of now blow muted trumpets.”58  
The above judgment clearly demonstrates that ouster clauses in decrees 
and edicts effectively circumscribed access to court by aggrieved 
persons. In limited cases where right of access existed and the judiciary 
was willing to demonstrate judicial activism, enjoyment, protection, and 
promotion of human rights were further hampered by incidences of 
disobedience to court orders.59  Undoubtedly, it is one thing for a court to 
grant a remedy sought by an individual, but quite another for the 
successful party to reap the fruits of his judgment. This is because the 
court cannot enforce its own order as it does not have the necessary 
machinery to do so.60 Consequently, apart from undermining the 
authority and integrity of the court, disobedience to court orders is a 
grave assault on human rights promotion and protection. The frustration 
of the judiciary on account of disobedience of court orders was 
beautifully captured by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of 
Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu,61 when it lamented that: 
During World War 11 Lord Atkin was still able to say, “In this 
country amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They be 
changed but they speak the same language in war as in 
peace…Judges are no respecters of persons and stand between 
the subject and …any attempted encroachment on his liberty by 
the Executive alert to see that any coercive action is justified in 
law.” I can safely say here in Nigeria (that) even under a military 
government, the law is no respecter of persons, principalities, 
governments or powers and the courts stand between the citizens 
and the government alert to see that the state or government is 
bound by the law and respects the law.62  
The use of Special Military Tribunals also gravely impacted the 
promotion and protection of human rights during military rule. Although 
complete independence of the judiciary in democratic dispensation may 
  
 58. Wang Chin-Yao, LRC (Const.) 391 at 330. 
 59. For some instances, see, Aduba, supra note 47, at 109-37. 
 60. The Constitution expressly confers the power of law enforcement on the executive branch, 
which all law enforcement agencies are members of.See CONSTITUTION, Art. 5 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 61. Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu, [1986] 1 NWLR 621. 
 62. Id. at 647-648 
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be debatable,63 the courts are created in such a manner as to ensure a 
reasonable measure of independence and impartiality of judges so that 
proceedings are free from bias and extraneous considerations. This is not 
so of military tribunals which are characteristically composed of soldiers 
with little or no knowledge of law and no regard for human rights, due 
process, or judicial precedent. What is more, cases are heard and 
determined in camera, with the decisions hardly open to judicial review 
or appeal.64 Thus, the limitations suffered by human rights in the military 
era are as obvious as they are enormous.65 A particularly worrisome and 
monstrous curtailment of human rights during military regimes is located 
in the consistent use of retroactive legislation.66 During military regimes, 
many retroactive decrees with penal implications were promulgated. A 
notable example was the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree,67 
from 1984 which empowered the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters 
to detain persons who have contributed to the economic adversity of the 
nation.”68 Although Nigeria is presently under democratic governance,69 
the poor attitude and behavior of the current leaders70 in the areas of 
human rights are influenced by the reprehensible attitude of the military 
rulers demonstrated above.  
F. ABSENCE OF TRUE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
One of the enduring and indeed imperishable attributes of the common 
law is the notion of judicial independence.71 So important is this notion 
that it has become entrenched not only in the English judicial system, but 
in most judicial systems across the globe.72 The term judicial 
  
 63. Although sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 1999 Constitution guarantee separation of power, the 
Constitution also provides numerous instances of interaction between the various organs of 
government. 
 64. OSITA NNAMANI OGBU, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE IN NIGERIA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 338-339 (1999). 
 65. The civil populace is oppressed and repressed and there was obvious desecration of all 
civil institutions including the judiciary, which should have been an arbiter. 
 66. “Retroactive law” is defined as a legislative act that looks backward or contemplates the 
past, affecting acts or facts that existed before the act came into effect. Black’s Law Dictionary (9th 
ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS.  
 67. State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 (1984) (Nigeria). This decree was 
promulgated during the military regime of  Mohammadu Buhari and Tunde Ediagbon. 
 68. Other examples include the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 20 
(1984) (Nigeria) and the Counterfeit Currency (Special Provisions) Decree No. 22 (1984) (Nigeria). 
Under the former, some persons were executed for trying to export cocaine, a hard drug. 
 69. Nigeria returned to democratic governance on May 29, 1999, after over two decades of 
military rule. 
 70. Exemplified by press censorship, extra-judicial killings, and police brutality. See 
Adejuwon Soyinka, On Death Row, TELL MAGAZINE 18-23 (Nigeria), Apr. 20, 2009, which 
chronicled poor human rights regime in Nigeria. 
 71. See Garba  v. Univ. of Maiduguri, [1986] 1 NWLR 550 (Nigeria). 
 72. Id. at 570-75, 
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independence, otherwise referred to as the independence of the judiciary, 
does not lend itself to a generally accepted definition. Consequently, an 
examination of some attempts which have been made to define it will 
suffice for the present purpose. 
According to  Oyeyipo,73  
Judicial independence postulates that no judicial officer should 
directly or indirectly, however remote be put to pressure by any 
person whatsoever, be it government, corporate body or an 
individual to decide any case in a particular way. He should be 
free to make binding orders which must be respected by the 
legislature, the executive and the citizens, whatever their 
status… 
From the above premise, it can be safely concluded that judicial 
independence is not yet a reality but a mere aspiration in Nigeria today. 
The appointment and removal of judges are not insulated or isolated 
from politics, ethnicity favoritism, and other primordial considerations. 
Lamenting on the constraint against judicial independence in Nigeria, 
Tobi74 insightfully declared that “there were instances in the past where 
appointing bodies by sheer acts of favoritism and nepotism overturned 
the A.J.C. (Advisory Judicial Committee) list and planted their own by 
way of replacement.” Other authors have also categorically noted that 
“the appointment of judges cannot through the institutional mechanism 
of NJC (National Judicial Council) be insulated from political 
consideration and control.”75  
Apart from the problem of appointment and removal, the judiciary is 
faced with other formidable problems which inevitably compromise its 
independence and impartiality. The Nigerian Judiciary lacks financial 
autonomy in the real sense of the word, even though under the present 
constitutional dispensation, a measure of financial autonomy is sought to 
  
 73. T.A. Oyeyipo, Commentary on the paper captioned Whether the Establishment of the 
National Judicial Council and the Set-Up Will Bring a Lasting Solution to the Perennial Problems 
Confronting the Judiciaries in this Nation 5, delivered at the 1999 All Nigerian Judges Conference 
(NJC) held at International Conference Centre, Abuja, Nigeria November 1-5, 1999. 
 74. N. Tobi, paper entitled Whether the Establishment of the National Judicial Council and the 
Set-Up Will Bring a Lasting Solution to the Perennial Problems Confronting the Judiciaries of this 
Nation 19, delivered at the Annual Conference of Judges held at the International Conference 
Centre, Abuja, Nigeria, between November 1-5, 1999. 
 75. J. A. Dada & M. E. Ekpo, Issues and Problems in the Establishment of National Judicial 
Council under the 1999 Constitution, CALABAR L. J., 101-02 (2006). 
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be enthroned.76 Besides, the remuneration of judicial officers is not only 
inadequate but laughable. The implication of this is that judicial officers 
are exposed to avoidable temptations of being corrupt such that their 
judgments are not the result of legal rule, forensic argument of counsel, 
precedent, and cold facts of the case, but are rather dictated by 
extraneous considerations. The plight of many judges is worsened by 
environmental challenges of absence of social security and bloated 
extended family.77   
From the above, the challenge posed by the absence of true judicial 
independence is formidable. Similarly, its implications for human rights 
promotion and protection are no less daunting. 
G. PROBLEM OF DISOBEDIENCE TO COURT ORDERS 
Without doubt, accessibility to court by litigants is one thing, while the 
impartiality of the judge is another. Respect and obedience to the 
judgment and orders of the court is yet another important consideration. 
It is a notorious fact that judgments and orders of courts are not self-
executing and the judiciary does not have its own body or institution 
charged with the responsibility of enforcing its judgments.78 The 
implication of this fact is that the judiciary inevitably depends on the 
executive for the enforcement of its judgments. The executive branch, 
without doubt, is the greatest violator of human rights.79  It is the major 
“predator” from which judicial protection is often sought.80 This being 
the case, there is little guarantee that when an order is made against the 
executive branch, the same will be treated as sacrosanct. On the contrary, 
the unfortunate and regrettable experience has been regular disobedience 
of the executive to lawful and subsisting court orders.81 Often, 
government chooses the orders to obey. It obeys those it is comfortable 
with and disobeys those which are in conflict with its interest, ignoring 
the consequences to the individuals whose rights have been violated. 
  
 76. The 1999 Constitution empowers the National Judicial Council to “collect, control and 
disburse all moneys, capital and recurrent, for the judiciary.” CONSTITUTION, Third Schedule, Part 1, 
¶ 21(e) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 77. MUHAMMED MUSTAPHA AKANBI, THE JUDICIARY AND THE CHALLENGES OF JUSTICE 45 
(1996). 
 78. Under the 1999 Constitution, as amended, it is the responsibility of the executive branch to 
enforce the law, including judicial decisions. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 5 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 79. See MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 2 (2002). 
See also Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing for the 
Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 J. of Afr. L. 1-37 (2003). 
 80. I. Sagay, Newbreed Magazine, August 13, 1989 at 8. 
 81. This is amplified by the cases of Military Governor of Lagos State v. Chief Emeka O. 
Ojukwu, [1986] 1 NWLR 621 (Nigeria); Lakanmi & Kikelomo Ola v. Attorney General (Western 
State), [1971] UNIV. IFE L. REP. 201. 
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This is true both under military rule as well as democratic dispensation. 
For instance, the Federal Government refused to obey the Supreme Court 
judgment which declared illegal the withholding of revenue to the Lagos 
state local government.82 
The inevitable question therefore is: what is the value of a judgment and 
order which is disobeyed? Disobedience to court orders undoubtedly 
undermines the authority, dignity, and integrity of the court and can 
promote anarchy. But much more, it constitutes a remarkable challenge 
to the development and realization of human rights.83 
H. IMPACT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Without doubt, the impact of the political system and of 
underdevelopment—economic, social, political, and cultural—has a 
profound influence on the promotion and protection of human rights.84 
Nigeria, like most African countries, suffers convoluted political crisis 
and remarkable underdevelopment. The manifestations of these twin 
problems can be seen in the high level of illiteracy and poverty, the 
virtual collapse of social infrastructure, political instability, and constant 
military intervention. 
Eze85 identified some of the dimensions of our political system and 
underdevelopment which have negative impacts on human rights 
promotion and protection in Africa:  the scarcity of those material means 
needed for the advancement and preservation of human rights, the 
insecurity occasioned by political instability, the long years of military 
rule with its characteristic authoritarianism and desecration of human 
rights, the pretentious virtue of Western democracies, conflicting cultural 
and institutional patterns, as well as the low level of consciousness of a 
majority of African peoples. Other indices of underdevelopment include 
lack of basic infrastructure, unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty. 
Nigeria is buffeted in grave proportion by the above dimensions of 
underdevelopment. Many Nigerians live in want, abject poverty and 
penury, and are devastated by preventable diseases. Many wallow in 
seemingly irredeemable ignorance notwithstanding the Jomtiem 
  
 82. See A. G. of Lagos State v. A.G. of Federation, [2004] 20 NSCQR 99 (Nigeria); see also 
A. G.  Abia State v. A.G. Federation, [2006] 16 NWLR 265, wherein, although the Supreme Court 
declared it unconstitutional, the federal government paid deductions from the Federation directly to 
the local government. A. G. Federation v. A. G. Abia State & 35 Ors. (No. 2), [2002] 6 NWLR 542; 
A.G. of Ogun State & Ors v. A. G. of the Federation, [2002] 18 NWLR 232. 
 83. See, Umoh, supra note 54, at 47-48. 
 84. EZE, supra note 46, at 4. 
 85. Id. 
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Declaration of Education for All by the year 2000.86 Commenting on 
underdevelopment of Nigeria and its impact on human rights, Ake 
observed that “freedom of speech and freedom of the press do not mean 
much for a largely illiterate rural community completely absorbed in the 
daily rigors of the struggle for survival.”87  Lending his opinion on this 
problem, Aguda lamented that: 
The practical actualization of most of the fundamental rights 
cannot be achieved in a country like ours where millions are 
living below starvation level… In the circumstances of this 
nature, fundamental rights provisions enshrined in the 
constitution are nothing but meaningless jargon to all those of 
our people living below or just at starvation level.88 
Oputa,89 in recognizing the problem which the condition of our 
underdevelopment poses to the realization of human rights noted that:  
One of the best tests of the efficacy of the fundamental rights 
provisions of our constitution should …be whether the rights 
enshrined therein are accorded to the poor, the unemployed, the 
weak, the oppressed and the defenseless. In theory, our 
Constitution in its preamble talks nobly of “promoting the good 
government and welfare of all persons in our country on the 
principles of freedom, equality and justice”…But in actual 
practice one sees that it is the powerful, the rich and the 
dominant class that seem to have all the rights, while the only 
right left to the poor, the weak and the down-trodden seems to be 
their rights to suffer in silence, to be patient and wait for their 
reward in heaven (if they are believers). 
Indeed, it is our faulty political system and underdevelopment which is 
partly responsible for the grave neglect which the social, economic and 
cultural rights have suffered in Nigeria. Concomitantly, because human 
  
 86. The World Conference on Education For All, which took place March 5-9, 1990 at 
Jomtien, Thailand, declared inter alia that “education is indispensable for human progress and 
empowerment,” and as such that all must be educated by the year 2000. Nigeria committed itself to 
the realization of this vision, as one of the countries which attended the Conference. Thereafter, there 
was a re-affirmation of the goal of the Conference by Nigeria. See BENJAMIN OBI NWABUEZE, 
CRISES AND PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION IN NIGERIA 123 (1995). 
 87. Claude Ake, The African Context of Human Rights, 35 AFRICA TODAY 5, 6 (1987).  
 88. T. Akinola Aguda, Judicial Process and Stability in the Third Republic, NAT’L CONCORD 
Nov.7, 1988, at 7. 
 89. C. A. OPUTA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL CULTURE OF NIGERIA 67-68 
(1989). 
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rights are interdependent and interrelated, the civil and political rights 
cannot be meaningfully realized. 
I. LOCUS STANDI 
Human rights promotion and protection in Nigeria is too often hamstrung 
by the doctrine of locus standi. Locus standi means “legal standing” or 
the capacity—based on sufficient interest in a subject-matter—to 
institute legal proceedings in the pursuit of a certain cause.90 The courts 
have always insisted that unless a person has the locus standi, he is a 
meddlesome interloper and as such, a suit at his instance will be 
incompetent and unmaintainable.91   
Locus Standi is inextricably interwoven with the issue of jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, where there is want of locus standi, the court will have no 
jurisdiction to entertain the matter.92 In Attorney General of Kaduna State 
v. Hassan,93 Oputa J.S.C. succinctly articulated the raison deter for this 
doctrine as follows: “The legal concept of standing or locus is predicated 
on the assumption that no court is obliged to provide a remedy for a 
claim in which the applicant has a remote, hypothetical or no interest.”94 
Consequently, in human rights litigations the issue of locus standi or 
sufficient interest is not only relevant but paramount. Thus, for a person 
to sustainably activate the judicial process to redress an infraction of 
human rights, he must show that he is an interested person–one whose 
right has been, is being, or is in imminent danger of being violated or 
invaded. Where a public injury or public wrong or infraction of a 
fundamental right affecting an indeterminate number of people is 
involved, to be competent to sue, a plaintiff must show that he has 
suffered more, or is likely to suffer more, than the multitude of 
individuals who have been collectively wronged. Thus, although there is 
now a commendable relaxation of the rigid, restrictive and constrictive 
  
 90. See Abraham Adesanya v. The President of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, [1981] 2 
N.C.L.R. 358 (Nigeria); Adenyga v. Odemeru, [2003] F.W.L.R. (pt 158) 1258 (Nigeria); Attorney 
General, Kaduna State v. Hassan, [1985] 2 N.W.L.R. (pt 8) 483 (Nigeria); Akilu v. Fawehinmi, (No. 
2) [1989] 2 N.W.L.R. (pt 102) 122 (Nigeria).  
 91. See, e.g., Odeneye v. Efunuga, [1990] 7 N.W.L.R. (pt 164) 618 (Nigeria); Abraham 
Adesanya v. The President of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria, [1981] 2 N.C.L.R. 358 (Nigeria). 
 92. Akinbinu vs Oseni, [1992] 1 NWLR 97 (Nigeria). 
 93. Hassan, 2 N.W.L.R. (pt 8) 483. 
 94. Id. at 524-525. 
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interpretation of the doctrine of locus standi,95 the doctrine remains a 
formidable albatross in human rights litigation in Nigeria. 
J. WEAK INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A major deficiency in the development of human rights is one of 
enforcement. Since the enforcement of human rights largely depends on 
the domestic machinery of national governments,96 Nigeria has erected 
seemingly firm institutional infrastructure to safeguard human rights in 
the country. The institutional infrastructure includes the judiciary,97 the 
National Human Rights Commission,98 the Public Complaints 
Commission,99 and the Legal Aid Council.100  Regrettably, the various 
institutional mechanisms are not strong enough or capable of providing 
adequate and effective platforms for meaningful human rights promotion 
and protection. This is especially so because many of these institutional 
mechanisms are not independent and do not have the financial and 
logistical capability to meaningfully function as they ought to. This 
article earlier spotlighted some of the problems confronting the judiciary. 
The extra-judicial bodies are in a more precarious position. Being 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government through funding, 
composition of membership, and provision of operational guidelines, 
among others, government interference or influence becomes not a mere 
possibility but a reality. For instance, it is widely believed that the 
redeployment of Kehinde Ajoni, the erstwhile Executive Secretary of the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), was a result of the 
scathing human rights report she presented at the 9th session of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council101 held in Geneva, Switzerland on 
Monday, February 9, 2008. 
  
 95. This relaxation is exemplified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the celebrated case 
of Akilu v. Fawehinmi, 2 NWLR 122. 
 96. STEINER ET AL., supra note 16, at 709. 
 97. Established by the 1999 Constitution (as amended). CONSTITUTION, Art. 6 (1999) 
(Nigeria).  
 E. stablished pursuant to the National Human Rights Commission Act, (2004) Cap. 46 
(Nigeria).  
 99. Established by the Public Complaints Commission Act, (2004) Cap. 37 (Nigeria). 
 100. Established under the Legal Aid Act, (2004) Cap. L9 (Nigeria). 
 101. See Adejuwon Soyinka, On Death Row, TELL MAGAZINE (Nigeria), Apr. 20, 2009, at 20-
22. 
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II. PRESCRIPTION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
It is the state, with its various institutions, which is primarily responsible 
for guaranteeing the implementation and enforcement of human rights.102 
This mandate is explicitly stated in the Charter of the United Nations as 
follows: 
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of 
‘universal’ respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedom.103 
Consequently, to overcome the multitudinous challenges stated above, it 
is imperative that necessary constitutional and institutional reforms be 
undertaken in addition to the need for government to demonstrate 
pragmatic political will to promote and protect human rights. It is 
therefore intended in this part to briefly propose the following reforms 
which, if faithfully implemented, will ensure better protection and aA 
A. EXCLUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS FROM THE AMBIT 
OF SECTION 12 OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
Human rights instruments should be excluded from the provision of 
section 12 of the 1999 Constitution requiring the National Assembly to 
enact treaties to which Nigeria is a party into law before they become 
binding and enforceable in Nigeria. This means that any international 
human rights instrument to which Nigeria is a party will automatically 
become applicable and enforceable in Nigeria without the necessity of 
the same being enacted into law by the National Assembly. This way, 
Nigeria will be bound by all human rights instruments it ratifies on the 
basis of pacta sunt servanda. 
B. ABRIDGEMENT OF LIMITATION PROVISIONS: 
The ambit of permissible constitutional derogations must be severely 
limited. Accordingly, the various sections—such as sections 33 and 45 of 
  
 102. HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT 257 (Janusz 
Symonides ed., 2003). 
 103. U.N. Charter art. 56. In addition, other international human rights instruments specifically 
define States’ undertakings for the promotion and protection of human rights. For instance, the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action provides that the protection and promotion of human 
rights is the first responsibility of governments. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, preamble, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/CONF.157/24, 
(July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action]. 
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the 1999 Constitution which provide wide and sometimes nebulous 
limitations on some of the rights—must be amended. The danger posed 
by these derogation clauses informs their condemnation by Honorable 
Justice Bhagwatti. In his words:   
We must therefore take care to ensure that in no situation, 
however grave it may appear, shall we allow basic human rights 
to be derogated from, because once there is a derogation for an 
apparently justifiable cause, there is always a tendency in the 
wielders of powers in order to perpetuate their power, to 
continue derogation of human rights in the name of security of 
the state. Effective respect for human rights must place two 
kinds of restrictions on the forces of derogation. It must limit the 
circumstances and specify the procedures under which 
derogation may be legitimately invoked and it must also identify 
and reserve certain core human rights such as the right to life or 
the right to personal liberty, or freedom ex post facto from 
criminal laws which are the most vital from a political science 
perspective, as absolutely non-derogable.104  
We consider it irresistible to commend this insightful pronouncement to 
the Nigerian State.  
C. STRENGTHENING OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL BODIES: 
Extra-judicial bodies for human rights enforcement must be strengthened 
to promote their efficiency and efficacy in human rights promotion and 
protection. Judicial enforcement of human rights is characteristically 
protracted and expensive. This is why over-reliance and dependence on 
the judiciary must be de-emphasized and discouraged in favor of these 
extra-judicial bodies which are less cumbersome, less technical and 
inexpensive. Accordingly, the human rights agencies should enjoy 
reasonable independence to free them from executive interference.105 In 
addition, the agencies especially, the National Human Rights 
Commission, and the Public Complaints Commission must be 
strengthened and adequately funded. The constituent instruments of the 
Commissions should be amended to grant them financial autonomy so 
that they can discharge their noble statutory mandate. Apart from 
ensuring the financial autonomy of the Commissions, government should 
be charged with the responsibility of providing technical and 
  
 104. Bhagwati, supra note 7, at xxi. 
 105. As earlier noted, the appointment, funding, and operational guidelines of these executive 
bodies are controlled by the executive branch of government—often the most dangerous human 
rights predator. 
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infrastructural support and solidarity for their work and those of other 
human rights organizations.  
D. DEDICATED OBEDIENCE TO COURT ORDERS: 
The executive branch has the onerous, important, and compelling duty to 
ensure prompt compliance with the orders of the courts.  Human rights 
should no longer be a matter of rhetoric. Rather, the government must 
constantly and deliberately seek to advance the cause of human rights 
through human rights-friendly legislation, policies, and actions. It is 
fitting and commendable that the Federal Government of Nigeria, in 
response to the recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Program 
of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
Australia in 1963,106 has drawn up a comprehensive National Action Plan 
for the promotion and protection of Human Rights in Nigeria.107 In 
furtherance of the mandate of the Vienna Declaration, the Nigerian 
National Action Plan has carefully identified and drawn up an integrated 
and systematic national strategy to help realize the advancement of 
human rights in Nigeria. This noble and laudable effort will be 
meaningless and remain dead letters if the government fails to honestly 
and committedly pursue the program of action articulated therein. In 
discharging this commitment, the Government must always ensure that 
persons of proven integrity with spotless moral character are those 
appointed to the bench and bodies consecrated for human rights 
promotion and protection. 
E. SUSTAINMENT OF DEMOCRACY: 
Human rights can no longer be meaningfully discussed outside a 
democratic environment. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the more democratic 
a state is, the less violation of human rights the citizens of that state 
experience.108 The current democratic environment, with all its 
imperfections, is undoubtedly more clement for the protection and 
development of human rights than military rule, which is 
characteristically associated with autocracy and totalitarianism. As the 
Vienna Declaration succinctly states, “democracy, development and 
  
 106. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 103.  
 107. The National Action Plan (NAP) for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
Nigeria was presented at the United Nations at Geneva, Switzerland in July, 2009, available at 
http://www.dhnet.org.br/dados/pp/nacionais/pndh_nigeria_2_2009_2013.pdf. 
 108. STEINER ET AL., supra note 16, at 207 
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing.”109 
Accordingly, the current culture of violence and impunity must be halted. 
Those in public offices, especially in the legislative and executive 
branch, must be more transparent in the way the affairs of government 
are conducted just as they owe a duty to abide by the mandate of section 
15(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to “abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuse of power.” Further, to sustain our current democracy, 
the political class must remember the injunction of section 13 of the 1999 
Constitution that “it is the duty and responsibility of all organs of 
government, and all the authorities and persons exercising legislative, 
executive and judicial powers to conform to, observe and apply the 
provisions of the fundamental objectives and directives of state policy.” 
This is an unmistakable agenda for good governance. It is in keeping 
faith with this agenda that democracy will be sustained, and 
concomitantly, human rights will be better protected in Nigeria.  
CONCLUSION 
Without doubt, concern for human rights is universal, which is why the 
concept of human rights has gained remarkable appeal and significance 
in our world of pluralism, diversity, and interdependence. Regrettably, 
the enjoyment of human rights in Nigeria—as in many nations across the 
globe—has been hamstrung by multifarious and multidimensional 
impediments. This is why atrocious violations of human rights still exist 
in Nigeria today. Many of the hindrances to human rights protection in 
Nigeria have been sustained, and remain unabated, partly because of a 
lack of genuine and practical commitment on the part of the government 
to ensure meaningful enjoyment of these rights. Successive Nigerian 
governments, like many governments, have not been able to match the 
impressive record of codification and prescription of the rights with 
equally rigorous application and enforcement. Rather, they have been 
contented with mere codification presumably because—as noted by 
Haleem—110generally, governments find it difficult to vote against what 
is deemed to be good and what makes prudent political sense in light of 
the fact that human rights issues now form part of the equation of 
international relations. 
  
 109. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 103, at ¶ 8. 
 110. Muhammad.Haleem, The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, in 
DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 91, 101 (1988).  
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Since human rights are most effectively protected at the national level, it 
is therefore imperative for each national government to take all 
legislative, judicial, and administrative measures in order to prevent, 
prohibit, and eradicate all human rights violations. It should not merely 
be fashionable to accept and adopt international human rights 
instruments. Rather, practical commitment ought and should be 
demonstrated at all times towards the realization of their noble 
objectives. Accordingly, it is hereby advocated that meaningful steps be 
taken to adopt the proposals for reform stated in this article among 
others. Specifically, the ambit of permissible derogation must be well-
defined and severely limited. Further, the dualist model on the 
applicability of international human rights treaties should be abolished as 
it constitutes a significant drawback to human rights protection in 
Nigeria. Finally, the courts must at all times adopt a generous 
interpretation of human rights provisions—and avoid what has been 
called the austerity of tabulated legalism—suitable to give individuals 
the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedom. 
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